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Is China a “Rule-by-Law” Regime?
KWAI HANG NG†
Does China have the rule of law? It is a question often
asked and debated, not least for the fact that the Chinese
government sometimes seems to convey the idea that they
are promoting the rule of law. In recent annual plenary
meetings of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the
Chinese term 法治 (fazhi), often translated loosely as “the
rule of law” in English, is raised as the theme of these most
publicized and hi-power meetings. The Fourth Plenum of the
18th Central Committee that took place in 2014 was dubbed
by many as the “rule of law plenum.”
Does China have the rule of law? Most scholars studying
the Chinese legal system would say no.1 Certainly, scholars
differ in prognosticating whether China is moving towards
the rule of law or drifting further away from it.2 But they

† Department of Sociology, University of California, San Diego. Many thanks to
the participants at the Buffalo conference for their questions and comments. I
would also like to thank Martin Krygier for suggesting relevant works on the
subject, in particular the work of Nick Cheesman.
1. See STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE : LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER
MAO (Stanford Univ. Press 1999); THE LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA
(Karen G. Turner et al. eds, Univ. of Wash. Press 2000).
2. See Carl F. Minzner, China’s Turn Against Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 935
(2011) (arguing China has moved away from rule of law); RANDALL PEERENBOOM,
CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW (Cambridge Univ. Press 2002)
(arguing China is moving from rule by law to a form of rule of law); Larry
Diamond, The Rule of Law as Transition to Democracy in China, 12 J. CONTEMP.
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generally agree on the usefulness of the rule of law as a
yardstick to evaluate the Chinese legal system. The take on
the status quo of the Chinese legal system among optimists
and pessimists alike is surprisingly consensual—China has
yet to develop a robust rule of law. What it has is instead rule
by law.
Despite the near consensus that China is practicing rule
by law, the meaning of rule by law is not as certain. The
concept is too often glossed over. We jump to the conclusion
too quickly—“It is not the rule of law, but just rule by law.”
In so doing, rule by law is treated almost as a residual,
negative concept, not only in the sense that it connotes
negatively (although it does), but that the concept is defined
negatively. It is formalistic and morally empty.3
Rule by law is understood negatively—rule of law it is
not. Analytically, it is the degenerative form of the liberal
democratic version of the rule of law, often found in
authoritarian regimes.4 The “law” in rule by law is a means
for authoritarian control and repression.5 It is a kind of bad
rule that confers surface legitimacy to authoritarian
regimes. 6 As Gallagher puts it, “[it] brings the allure of
constraints and rules on others while continued state-led
control over deployment of these institutions provides
opportunity for discretion and flexibility.” 7 Cheesman
CHINA 319 (2003) (arguing a shift toward rule of law is necessary for
democratization in China).
3. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 92–
93 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2004).
4. See Tom Ginsburg, In Defense of Imperialism? The Rule of Law and the
State-building Project, in GETTING TO THE RULE OF LAW 224, 226–27 (James E.
Fleming ed., 2011).
5. Martin Krygier, Rule of Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 233, 234 (Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012)
[hereinafter Krygier, Rule of Law].
6. See Ginsburg, supra note 4.
7. MARY E. GALLAGHER, AUTHORITARIAN LEGALITY IN CHINA: LAW, WORKERS,
STATE 47 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2017) [hereinafter GALLAGHER,
AUTHORITARIAN LEGALITY IN CHINA]. Gallagher uses the term “authoritarian
AND THE
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underlines its derivative nature by describing it as a concept
that “has no immanent contents of its own.”8 It is “what you
get because institutions are not working well enough to have
anything better.”9 “Rule by law is what is, the rule of law is
what ought to be.”10
There is little dispute about the lack of independence for
legal institutions in China. My point is that there is a gap, or
rather, a conceptual leap, from what we know (the Chinese
system does not practice the rule of law) to the conclusion
drawn (the Chinese system practices rule by law). The
concept of the rule of law is highly amorphous.11 In its most
expansive and substantive form, the rule of law is
inextricably tied to liberal democracy. 12 The rule of law
protects and strengthens legal, political, private, and
institutional liberty.13 Such is the way international NGOs
(non-governmental organizations) and legal professionals
promote the rule of law in many non-western countries. 14
The Council of the International Bar Association, for
example, passed a resolution in 2005 that said: “The Rule of
Law is the foundation of a civilised society. It establishes a
transparent process accessible and equal to all. It ensures
adherence to principles that both liberate and protect.”15 The
legality” to describe the Chinese-style rule of law. Id. at 30.
8. Nick Cheesman, Law and Order as Asymmetrical Opposite to the Rule of
Law, 6 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 96, 105 (2014).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. TAMANAHA, supra note 3, at 91–92.
12. Besides the dominant thick liberal version of the rule of law, there are
other “thick” versions that are tied to other values and ideologies. For a survey of
other thick theories in Asia, see ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW: THEORIES AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF RULE OF LAW IN TWELVE ASIAN COUNTRIES, FRANCE AND THE
U.S. (Randall Peerenboom ed., Routledge 2004).
13. TAMANAHA, supra note 3, at 32–46, 91–101.
14. Martin Krygier, Four Puzzles About the Rule of Law: Why, What, Where?
And Who Cares?, 50 NOMOS 64, 96–97 (2011).
15. TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAW 171 (Allen Lane 2010) (quoting the
Council of the International Bar Association).
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shortcoming of a conspicuously “thick” concept of the rule of
law is that there are just too many ways to fall short of it.16
The expansive version of the concept proselytizes an
idealized vision of liberal democracy that becomes an
impossible yardstick for evaluating other political systems.
A goal of this Article is to go beyond using “rule by law”
as an epithet to describe China. In the next section, I present
an analysis of the Chinese case based on a definition of rule
by law that is stripped-down and yet non-vacuous. I then
discuss how well the concept serves as a measuring rod for
China. For the exercise, a good measuring rod is defined as
one that is valid. The validity of the concept rule by law
cannot be isolated from the historical and social reality to
which it is applied. Does the concept describe and explain
how law works in China? The second half of the paper
discusses one possible way to develop a positive narrative—
law as policy.
THE CONCEPTUAL CONTENT OF RULE BY LAW
The Chinese Communist Party wants people to study the
guiding thoughts of its leaders, from Mao, to Deng, and now
Xi Jinping. In an important sense, one does not need to
micro-analyze the recent sayings of Chinese leaders to get a
reading of their legal philosophy. They are not evasive. In
fact, they have been quite clear and relatively consistent.
Since Deng Xiaoping, PRC (People’s Republic of China)
leaders, including Xi, describe what they do as 依法治国（yi
fa zhi guo). The official translation of yi fa zhi guo is “to
govern the country according to law,” or as some have
translated, rule according to law. The sentence “the People’s
Republic of China governs the country according to law and
makes it a socialist country under rule of law” (Article 5) was
first added to the Constitution in 1999. This in part accounts

16. There are of course “thinner” definitions of the rule of law that emphasize
the preventive character of the concept to constrain power and avoid abuse. See
Krygier, Rule of Law, supra note 5, at 234–36.
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for why scholars refer to China as a “rule-by-law” country.
Law is seen as an instrument to rule at the disposal of the
state. Legal power is not an independent power to temper
other forms of power; it is power at the service of political
power.17
Conceptually, what can one say positively about rule by
law? What is that rule-like or law-related quality in rule by
law? As a conceptual lens, does rule by law fit China? Does
the concept resonate with the empirical reality that it
attempts to explain? Does it help observers understand more
clearly the legal development of China? I answer the
questions by identifying three essential characteristics of
rule by law—commanding, opaque, and arbitrary.
A. Command
The command metaphor is a familiar one. Legal
positivist John Austin famously treats law as command.18
What law commands is obedience. Its merit or demerit is a
different question. Put differently, to say that law is
commanding is to emphasize its ruling and forceful
character. As Krygier points out, “whatever the character of
the laws themselves . . ., if law in a particular society is
routinely trumped by, say, raw legally unauthorized exercise
of power by gangsters, conmen, or more generally legally
unauthorized power-wielders, it makes little sense to speak
of the rule of law.” 19 Does Chinese law work like a set of
commands? One would think that China is an open-and-shut
case of commanding law. We see that in the police state that
it runs in regions where ethnic and religious minorities
17. This distinction of rule of law and rule by law is more a matter of degree.
Shapiro is famous for making the claim that the notion of judicial independence
inherent in the notion of rule of law is a myth. MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A
COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 1 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1981).
18. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE
USES OF THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE 1, 13–15 (Isaiah Berlin et al. eds.,
Humanities Press 1965).
19. Krygier, Rule of Law, supra note 5, at 234.
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cluster. We also see that in areas related to the political
legitimacy of the party state and questions about national
unity. The Chinese party state is sensitive to any challenge
to its power. Draconian laws are devised to control and limit
any behavior that questions the legitimacy of the rule of the
CCP. In many cases, whether state actions follow the law or
not is beside the point, as the law offers blanket power to the
police and other authorities to do what is needed to maintain
political stability. There is little tolerance for infractions
against the state. The law commands obedience.
Undoubtedly, the party state’s restriction of political
freedom and its tight rein on civil liberty are the main
reason, and for many, a sufficient reason, to consider rule by
law an apt label to describe China. In some parts of the
country, China is deploying state-of-the-art surveillance
technologies to identify and punish any violation of law. The
law positively commands compliance. It is an executivecentered approach to law. The law carries the will of the
party state. China seems to be a textbook case of rule by law.
However, when one looks at the legal system as a whole,
there are other aspects of law that are less commanding and
more negotiable. Much of the business of the sprawling court
system is not criminal. Criminal cases now make up just
about six percent of the total caseload of the Chinese courts.20
Of course, quantity isn’t everything and a few high-profile
and well-publicized cases are enough to set the tone. But for
many litigants in China, their cases are more quotidian than
political. In fact, the most actively expanding sectors of the
legal system are not its criminal wing. Civil and commercial
disputes are the fastest growing sectors of law.
Marketization not only brings prosperity to China. It
also brings about more interpersonal conflicts. It is in the
handling of these disputes and conflicts that we see the other

20. In 2016, for example, criminal cases made up only 6.4 percent. See Zuigao
Renmin Fayuan Gongzuo Baogao 2017 (Report on the Work of the Supreme
People’s Court 2017), http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-37852.html.
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side of the Chinese legal system, a side that the rule by law
thesis does not point us to see. This side is less strident and
repressive. On the basis of the rule by law thesis, it is
puzzling to find that Chinese judges often avoid using the
law. They either hold back on imposing or do not fully impose
the law on civil litigants. Chinese judges are used to making
political discernment. When they see a case as a dispute
between individuals rather than a challenge to the party
state, they can be surprisingly flexible in exercising the law.
The line distinguishing the two is of course a fluid one but
many Chinese judges are adroit at gauging the political
sensitivity of a case. It is worthwhile to note that the
conventional criminal-civil distinction does not reflect the
discernment that frontline judges exercise. Judges are more
concerned about whether a case is routine or “problem”;
mishandling of the latter would lead to “malicious
incidents.” 21 Routine disputes can be civil in legal
classification—family disputes, or other kinds of emerging
tort disputes can be found in China. Some disputes can also
be criminal, such as cases of assaults, theft and robbery, and
hit-and-runs. Even though many of these cases are, legally
speaking, criminal cases, the party state has gradually
moved away from harsh punishments to resolve criminal
cases in a “civil justice” way—i.e., the focus is about getting
defendants to compensate and apologize to their victims.22
When dealing with bitter disputes, the courts are often
law-shy. Judges play the role of mediator first and
adjudicator second. A decade ago (2009), the Supreme
People’s Court (SPC) released its Third Five-Year Reform
Plan that put more emphasis on the “mass line,” or
“adjudication for the people,” suggesting a populist turn by

21. See Xin He, ‘No Malicious Incidents’: The Concern for Stability in China’s
Divorce Law Practice, 26 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 467 (2017).
22. Kwai Hang Ng & Xin He, The Institutional and Cultural Logics of Legal
Commensuration: Blood Money and Negotiated Justice in China, 122 AM. J. SOC.
1104, 1125 (2017).
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the courts. 23 The practical result of this is a renewed
emphasis on the use of mediation to resolve conflicts. The
function of conflict resolution given to law means that law is
not viewed as an independent power that operates according
to its own rules. Instead, it is given a political goal and the
judicial system is tightly entrenched as part of the
administrative bureaucracy to promote societal harmony.
Sensitivity and insecurity to popular opinion and to
protesters also contribute to a bureaucratic mentality shared
among frontline judges that privileges mediation and
reconciliation. As scholars who study the Chinese judicial
system have pointed out, the Chinese system spends an
inordinate amount of time facilitating and sometimes even
coercing mediated settlements. At the height of this
mediation movement about a decade ago, grassroots courts
typically recorded a mediation rate of over fifty percent, and
some of them boasted a mediation of eighty to ninety
percent.24 Even though mediation is less emphasized under
Xi, it remains an integral part of “doing law” in the
grassroots courts. Courts avoid using the law if possible,
particularly so in rural inland regions. As mentioned, this
tendency crosses and muddles the traditional civil-criminal
divide. In many non-political criminal cases, the courts have
moved away from the policy of harsh punishment to allow for
more leniency. In practice, this means an emphasis on
reconciliation. The use of fines in lieu of imprisonment is
common. 25 The policy creates a new set of problems,
particularly deepening inequality between the rich and the
poor. Even within the domain of criminal law, leniency is
now officially encouraged. Courts are willing to offer

23. Benjamin L. Liebman, A Populist Threat to China’s Courts?, in CHINESE
JUSTICE: CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 269, 296 (Margaret
Y.K. Woo & Mary E. Gallagher eds., 2011).
24. See Hao Xiong, Two Sides of Court Mediation in Today’s Southwest
Grassroots China: An Empirical Study in T Court, Yunnan Province, 1 ASIAN J.L
& SOC’Y 367 (2014).
25. Ng & He, supra note 22, at 1128.
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suspended sentencing to many criminals who commit
offenses such as drunk driving, public disturbance, and
assault, as long as they express remorse and are willing to
pay.
This tendency to placate is particularly pronounced
among cases in which larger groups are involved and in cases
in which protests may spread to a wider group. Judges are
instructed to exhaust all means to prevent the disputes from
escalating into social disturbance and “malicious incidents” (
恶性事件 exing shijian), such as protests, demonstrations, or
in more extreme cases, violent attacks upon judges that
sometimes end in the attacker committing suicide. 26 The
eruption of “malicious incidents” results in sanctions of
individual judges. Courts are also sensitive to media reports.
State-owned but market-oriented media not only are acting
to uphold the goals of the party state; they also act as arms
of the party state to engage in “popular opinion
supervision.” 27 In places where social stability is more
vulnerable (economically less-developed inland regions), the
environment of judging is so uncertain that it leads to a
general aversion to adjudication among the courts there.
When dealing with potentially disruptive cases, judges lean
on diversionary practices such as mediation in civil trials and
victim-criminal
reconciliation
in
criminal
trials.
Adjudication produces winners and losers. The judges’
concern is that winner-takes-all adjudicative decisions run
the risk of challenges by losing parties.
What I discussed here is certainly not unique to China.
Judicial systems around the world use mediation and other
forms of alternative dispute resolution (ADR). We are
familiar with the “vanishing trials” phenomenon in the
United States. 28 However, this tendency to push for
26. See He, supra note 21, at 468–69; Minzner, supra note 2, at 938.
27. Benjamin L. Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue? The Media in the Chinese
Legal System, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 37 (2005).
28. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and
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mediation does show how judges do law in China and it is
quite different from the general impression we have of a ruleby-law regime—for disputes among individuals, small
companies, and even corporations, the law is not keenly
applied. Enforcement also remains a problem in the less
economically developed regions. 29 To my knowledge, the
Chinese system is the only judicial system that the same
judge who adjudicates is also asked to mediate throughout
the course of an adversarial-style trial. This procedural
arrangement means that to describe Chinese-style judicial
mediation as bargaining in the shadow of the law is an
understatement. It is literally bargaining in the face of the
law.30
In the United States, mediation is often motivated by
economic reasons. The costs of litigation have become so
expensive that most individual litigants are simply “priced
out” of a full-scale trial. But in the case of China, the law is
avoided for different reasons. The reasons for pushing for
more mediation are administrative and political. Many civil
cases handled by the grassroots courts of China resemble the
cases handled by the small claims courts of this country.
Those cases do not involve large sums of money and litigants
are unrepresented. The court procedures are similarly
uncomplicated and swift. As mentioned, outside of the big
city courts, the mediation rate in China is generally higher
than fifty percent. In the absence of a prohibitive costs
disincentive, this strongly suggests that judges there are
more determined to push for settlement.
This goes to show that the law is not as commanding as
we believe. Even an authoritarian state has to pick its
Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
459(2004).
29. See Xin He, A Tale of Two Chinese Courts: Economic Development and
Contract Enforcement, 39 J.L. & SOC’Y 384 (2012) (analyzing links between
economic development and contract enforcement).
30. Kwai Hang Ng & Xin He, Internal Contradictions of Judicial Mediation
in China, 39 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 285, 287, 301 (2014).
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fights—judges know there is a risk of public pushback if the
law is used too much. The imagery of rule by law presents a
partial picture. Even though the party state consistently
rejects western-style constitutionalism, and the related
notion of the rule of law, its own brand of law is an eclectic
blend of hard and soft—commanding and draconian in
handling any threat to social stability and challenges to its
political authority, while flexible and pragmatic in its
treatment of the socially aggrieved.
B. Obscurity
Another characteristic of a rule-by-law regime is that the
laws are often obscure. Law that is unknown or opaque to
the public is hardly definite and clear to follow. In this sense,
rule by law is akin to rule without law, only that the former
produces a façade of law to cover up lawlessness. Krygier
suggests that some governments may rule by law but the
laws fail to exhibit the proper character of the rule of law,
that is, “if the laws are secret, retrospective, contradictory.”31
Once again, applying the criteria to evaluate the Chinese
case is not as straightforward as one would imagine. There
are some aspects of the Chinese law that seem indefinite and
do not announce themselves in advance to fulfil the so-called
ex ante function of law.32 One obvious example is the rule of
analogy that was included in the 1979 Criminal Law, which
allowed judges to sentence on an offense not specified by the
law by reference to the closest analogous provision. The rule
was removed when China revised its criminal code in 1997
and the principle of nulla poena sine lege was introduced.
However, the rule of analogy was still referred to in later
Supreme People’s Court interpretation of the PRC Criminal
Procedure Law.33 Then there are offenses that are so vague
31. Krygier, Rule of Law, supra note 5, at 235.
32. See John M. Darley, et al., The Ex Ante Function of the Criminal Law, 35
L. & SOC’Y REV. 165, 165 (2001).
33. PITMAN B. POTTER, CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM 37–38 (Polity Press 2013).
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that it is hard to identify the bright lines between what is
allowed by law and what is not, casting long shadow over
public expression of views deemed by the state to be
offensive. The most infamous of this type is the offense of
“picking quarrels and provoking troubles.” The offense has
long been criticized as catch-all excuses for arbitrary state
repression. 34 And the law regarding “disturbing social
order,” scattered in both criminal and commercial laws, is
sometimes used to sanction small-scale protests.
At the same time while this authoritarian display of legal
power continues, China has passed a huge volume of
legislation and administrative regulations to make its legal
system more rules-based. The central government also works
hard to disseminate law. Campaigns were organized to send
law to the public. In the Rule of Law Index compiled by the
World Justice Project in recent years, China consistently
ranked far below the median in many factors contributing to
the index. Its scoring on publicizing the law is however a
bright spot, relatively speaking.35 The party state also has
implemented policies to promote access to court. It did so by
lowering court fees in 2006 to reduce litigation-related
expenditures for socially or economically disadvantaged
groups, especially for peasants in less developed parts of the
country. 36 Before that, local courts had more discretion
charging court fees at a level they desired and could
manipulate fees to create an extra hurdle for litigants. The
party state has been relatively successful in promoting the
use of law, especially in urban cities. This is reflected in the
growing judicial caseloads of the grassroots courts. Judges in
34. Stanley Lubman, ‘Picking Quarrels’ Casts Shadow Over Chinese Law,
WALL ST. J. (June 30, 2014, 9:10 AM), https://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime
/2014/06/30/picking-quarrels-casts-shadow-over-chinese-law/.
35. YA-WEN LEI, THE CONTENTIOUS PUBLIC SPHERE : LAW, MEDIA, AND
AUTHORITARIAN RULE IN CHINA 36 (Princeton Univ. Press 2018) (ranking
sixteenth (eighty-fourth percentile) in this factor).
36. Michael Palmer & Chao Xi, The People’s Republic of China, in THE COSTS
FUNDING OF CIVIL LITIGATION: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 261, 261
(Christopher Hodges et al. eds., 2010).
AND
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the biggest and busiest urban courts handle hundreds of
cases a year.37
There is also a stronger sense of legal consciousness
among the ordinary people of China. 38 Marginal groups
including workers and peasants use the law to hold local
officials accountable. The traditional imagery of a rule-bylaw regime using law in a top-down fashion to control and
suppress certainly does not capture this feedback loop of law
in China, and perhaps also in other authoritarian regimes.39
Citizens are encouraged to use the law to challenge abuse of
power by grassroots bureaucrats. Law has become a common
and legitimate language for ordinary people to formulate
their complaints. Law sometimes serves as a weapon of the
weak.40
C. Arbitrariness
The third oft-invoked feature of rule by law is its
arbitrariness. In A.V. Dicey’s famous definition of the rule of
law, the first characteristic of the concept is a system of
government that excludes the arbitrary exercise of power by
persons in authority. 41 Arbitrariness is the opposite of
determinacy. A state makes up the law as it goes on. Lon
37. There has been an uptick of attrition of judges as a result of the crushing
workload. Meng Yu & Guodong Du, Chinese Courts Facing Litigation Explosion,
CHINA JUST. OBSERVER (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.chinajusticeobserver.com
/insights/chinese-courts-facing-litigation-explosion.html.
38. Mary E. Gallagher, Mobilizing the Law in China: “Informed
Disenchantment” and the Development of Legal Consciousness, 40 L. & SOC’Y REV.
783, 783 (2006) [hereinafter Gallagher, Mobilizing the Law]; LEI, supra note 35,
at 36 (citing Gallagher).
39. See RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES
(Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2008); Tamir
Moustafa, Law and Courts in Authoritarian Regimes, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI.
281, 281–99 (2014).
40. See GALLAGHER, AUTHORITARIAN LEGALITY IN CHINA, supra note 7, at 80;
LEI, supra note 35, at 45; Gallagher, Mobilizing the Law, supra note 38, at 793–
94.
41. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION
188 (10th ed. 1959).
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Fuller, for example, argues that determinacy is a key
attribute of the rule of law. 42 The law should be publicly
announced and be enforced in a predictable manner.
Indeterminate or arbitrary application of law suggests a lack
of robust reasoning.
Judicial determinacy, to the extent that it is practiced in
reality, is always relative. Still it is tempting to ask: Do
Chinese courts apply the law in a reasoned, predictable
fashion that produces determinate outcomes? Are Chinese
judges arbitrary in their decisions? The question is a tough
nut to crack for social scientists because of the absence of
available data. Impressionistically though, it seems that the
courts have shown an improved degree of determinacy in
some areas of the law. Since the early days of market reform
in the 1980s, the party state has enacted massive volumes of
laws and regulations in areas such as contract, property,
copyrights, patents, and trademarks. The rapid expansion of
the Chinese legal system is aimed at promoting economic
activities. 43 Law continues to play the role of providing
ground rules for the market to develop; it is also used to
sanction misbehaviors, both by private parties and by agents
of the party state, and in some cases, to redress afflicted
parties.
China has also passed a lot more law to carry out its
market-oriented development strategies.44 In 2015, over onethird of the civil cases, or a total of 3.34 million cases, were
commercial cases (finance cases, private lending disputes,
sales contract disputes, intellectual property cases, corporate
disputes, maritime cases). 45 On top of these commercial
42. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 46–91 (rev. ed., Yale Univ. Press
1969).
43. Jacques deLisle, Law and the Economy in China, in ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF THE CHINESE ECONOMY 255, 255 (Gregory C. Chow & Dwight H.
Perkins eds., 2015).
44. See KWAI HANG NG & XIN HE, EMBEDDED COURTS: JUDICIAL DECISION(2017).

MAKING IN CHINA

45. Id. at 27.
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cases were private loan cases not involving financial
institutions, i.e., lending disputes between individuals,
between a company and an individual, or between two or
more companies, which accounted for about another twentytwo percent of civil cases.46 If we combine the two categories
(commercial cases and private lending disputes), over half of
all of the civil cases were disputes arising from market
transactions, either between individuals or among
corporations. 47 In big urban courts, judges that deal with
commercial litigations such as intellectual property rights,
securities, bankruptcy, and personal rights (privacy,
portrait, and reputation) are among the busiest and most
prestigious in their courts.
Law is used to promote economic growth under the policy
directives of the party state. The goal here is to create a legal
infrastructure for the unique state-led market economy of
China. A broad array of market activities, from simple bank
loans obtained by small businesses to corporations raising
capital in the stock market, are now done through law. More
recently, in the face of the prospects of slower growth, the
party state reiterated the role of law in facilitating voluntary
transactions, equal standing of parties, and improved
protections for some categories of insecure property rights.48
However, it remains to be the case that the courts behave
more like government bureaucracies than judicial
institutions. The party state is interested in the
instrumental function of law in promoting good governance.
46. SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, THE WORK OF CHINA’S COURTS 2015 (2016),
http://english.court.gov.cn/pdf/TheWorkofChina’sCourts2015.pdf.
47. NG & HE, supra note 44, at 27.
48. See Zhongguo Gongchandang di Shiba Jie Zhongyang Weiyuanhui di San
Ci Quanti Huiyi Gongbao (中国共产党第十八届中央委员会第三次全体会议公报)
[Communiqué of the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China] (adopted by the Cent. Comm. of the Communist
Party of China, Nov. 12, 2013), available at http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics
/2013-11/12/c_118113455.htm (Chinese) and http://www.china.org.cn/china
/third_plenary_session/2014-01/16/content_31212602.htm (English translation)
[hereinafter Communiqué].
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It holds a mindset that is more focused on outcome than
process. A rules-based approach to procedural justice that
values determinacy is often considered too rigid for
promoting economic prosperity or reinforcing social stability,
at least in the short term. For reasons I will explain, Chinese
judges are given a good degree of discretion in the judicial
process.49 In our recent book Embedded Courts, Xin He and
I presented examples to show how judges worked in the gray
zone. Many litigants did not see their judges as just carrying
the law. For example, in divorce cases in the rural regions,
some courts continued to deny women’s petitions to divorce
in the face of serious and repeated allegations of domestic
violence. 50 And that apparently contradicted what the
Marriage Law states. They were more concerned with the
consequences of their judicial decisions (e.g., how a volatile
husband would react if a woman was granted a divorce). In
the area of corporate law adjudication, in which there is a
strong will to achieve technical competence, it remains to be
the case that judges cannot ignore extralegal factors. During
the global financial crisis in 2008, when many exportoriented businesses suffered financial hardship, the
Shanghai High Court publicly issued a directive calling for
heightened sensitivity to the impact of judicial decisions on
distressed industries. 51 Furthermore, the tension between
protecting private rights and preserving state interests
remains strong in areas of law governing commercial
relationships. In the recent Communiqué of the Third

49. It is for this reason why we need to draw a distinction between the rule of
law and everyday decisional independence. Nowadays, Chinese judges, especially
those in urban cities, enjoy a palpable degree of decisional independence in
dealing with routine cases. But that does not mean that they always decide in
according with law. See NG & HE, supra note 44, at 118.
50. Xin He, Routinization of Divorce Law Practice in China: Institutional
Constraints’ Influence on Judicial Behavior, 23 INT’L J. L., POL’Y & FAM. 83, 102
(2009).
51. Nicholas Calcina Howson, Judicial Independence and the Company Law
in the Shanghai Courts, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA 134, 150 (Randall
Peerenboom ed., 2010).
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Plenum, it underlines the importance of striking a balance
between the role of the government and that of the market.52
Organizationally, the courts are part of the local partygovernment coalition. The CCP has established party groups
in every court. The courts also work alongside other bureaus,
including the public security bureau and the procuratorate
(in criminal cases) or other grassroots government branches
(in civil cases), the justice department under the ministry of
justice, as well as the local CCP’s Political-Legal Committee.
The courts even take charge of dealing with a set of stabilityrelated problems that in the eyes of most Western courts fall
squarely outside of the realm of law. A decade ago, in the
heyday of the campaign to promote the “harmonious society,”
some courts were asked to coordinate and lead in the
consultative and administrative process of “grand
mediation.”53 The word “grand” means “inter-departmental”
in Chinese bureaucratic lingo. Today, some local courts
continue to play a leading role in facilitating inter-bureau,
multilevel consultation on stability maintenance. They
coordinate and manage cases that involve the input of more
than one bureau, particularly when dealing with conflicts
that have the potential of turning into mass protests. Other
courts that assume a less prominent role in local governance
are still expected to show up and participate in various forms
of local campaigns, from wide-ranging themes that include
anti-corruption, birth control, respect for the elderly, and
street cleaning.
To say that the Chinese courts are arbitrary does not
really capture their complex character. As far as following
and applying the law is concerned, the courts apparently
display randomness. They are unpredictable. But there is
method in the randomness. The Chinese courts can be
judicially unpredictable but they are predictably pragmatic.

52. See Communiqué, supra note 48.
53. Keith J. Hand, Resolving Constitutional Disputes in Contemporary China,
7 U. PA. E. ASIA L. REV. 51, 143–44 (2011).
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Their everyday task is to maintain social stability and law is
an instrument, admittedly just one of the instruments, used
to achieve the goal. Grassroots Chinese judges often hold the
view that law is not for every occasion and not all the cases
that arrive at the doorsteps of the courthouse should be
adjudicated. Their decision-making process is guided by
other reasons, albeit different from the legal reasons that we
expect of a judicial institution.
In the common law, there is the idea of judge-made law.
Scholars debate about the active role of judges in
interpreting and developing the law. In the western tradition
of jurisprudence, writers emphasize the distinction of jus
dicere and jus dare to suggest that the job of judges is to
interpret law and not to make law.54 Yet the active work of
judges in China traverses the dichotomy of jus dicere and jus
dare because it is not of a jurisprudential nature. It is
administrative. Judges creatively interpret the law, or relax
the rules, at times expand and at times contract the bounds
of justiciability. Along the way they often offer off-the-book
ex parte advice to litigating parties. Chinese judges are at
their most innovative best when they work around the rules
to create an agreeable solution for all parties. This explains
why the dichotomy separating the rule of law and rule by law
does not manage to say a lot about the everyday operation of
the Chinese courts. It works to some extent in revealing the
political and repressive character of it in some areas. But it
does not articulate what law does for the party state in other
areas. The laws can be at times draconian, at times populist;
at times well-publicized, at times vague; at times rigid, at
times discretionary.
II. CHARACTER OF JUDICIAL ACTIVITIES IN CHINA
If rule by law is too much of a negative label for
understanding the Chinese legal system, what labels can we

54. See generally FRANCIS BACON, THE ESSAYS OR COUNSELS, CIVIL AND MORAL
(Brian Vickers ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1999).
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develop to positively describe China? I echo Cheesman’s call
that in studying law in non-western contexts, it is rewarding
if one can go beyond describing a case negatively (absence of
x) to develop an account that identifies the unique and novel
quality of the social form of law in place. Cheesman describes
those building block concepts for creating a positive account
as “asymmetrical” concept, in the sense that they cannot be
firmly situated along a sliding scale of the rule of law.55 They
are qualitatively distinct.56
III. LAW AS POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
The method in the randomness exhibited by the Chinese
courts signals a different approach to law. I describe this as
the logic of policy implementation. On this reading, the
written laws are, first and foremost, policy statements of the
party state. The well-known notion of the separation of
powers in liberal democracy sees the role of the legislature
as enacting laws for good governance. The executive is then
to carry those laws into effect. And the judiciary is to
interpret those laws and apply them accordingly. The
Chinese system is characterized by the convergence of
powers in the CCP. Non-separation or the mixing of powers
in the Chinese case means that laws passed by the
legislature reflect faithfully the policy intent of the executive.
And the judiciary, rather than interprets laws based on the
criteria of legality, uses decisions and in some cases, nondecisions, to advance the policy intent of the party state, to
see to the policy producing its desired effects. The central
state expects grassroots judges to honor the law, not as blackletter law but as policy statement.
Treating the law as policy helps to make sense of the
puzzle of legal empowerment in China. Law has been much
developed and strengthened in China in the past few
55. NICK CHEESMAN, OPPOSING
MAKE LAW AND ORDER 19 (2015)
56. See id.
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decades. The goal of the latest judicial reform in China,
spearheaded by the central government, is to address the
principal-agent problem prevalent in the Chinese judicial
system.57 The delegation of power is always a tricky exercise
for the party state. The central government is worried about
the abuse of power at the grassroots level. What the judicial
reform attempts to achieve is to rein in the abuse of legal
power by local governments and to redirect the use of legal
power at the service of the central government. 58 To wit,
leaders of the party state do not want to see the law used to
serve the interests of the agents.
Specifically, there are two types of abuses. The first is
the problem of local protectionism. One of the dogged
obstacles to the central government’s control of the judicial
system is the control local governments have over courts’
budgets. The old adage “Don’t bite the hand that feeds”
describes the attitude the Chinese courts held towards their
local governments. Political budgeting, i.e., budgeting
decisions that target judicial decision making, has plighted
the Chinese courts for many years. Lower-level governments’
control of judicial budget control begets local protectionism.59
It is a problem the SPC struggles to rectify because local
courts are fiscally dependent on the local governments. A
grassroots court is often an extension of the local
government. When there is a big local enterprise going up
57. In the past five years, China has been undergoing a series of judicial
reforms. The scope of the reform is broad and sweeping, addressing issues that
range from the implementation of case-filling registration, judicial openness, and
promoting the use of information technology in the courts. See Supreme People’s
Court, Judicial Reform of Chinese Courts, SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. (March 3, 2016),
http://english.court.gov.cn/2016-03/03/content_23898869.htm; see also Carl
Minzner, Legal Reform in the Xi Jinping Era, ASIA POL’Y, July 2015, at 4, 4–9;
Rebecca Liao, Judicial Reform in China, FOREIGN AFF. (Feb. 2, 2017),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017-02-02/judicial-reform-china.
58. Jerome A. Cohen, A Looming Crisis for China’s Legal System, FOREIGN
POL’Y (Feb. 22, 2016, 10:15 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/22/a-loomingcrisis-for-chinas-legal-system/.
59. See Xin He, Court Finance and Court Responses to Judicial Reforms: A
Tale of Two Chinese Courts, 31 L. & POL’Y 463 (2009).
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against another business headquartered in another province
or a foreign company, local courts factor that into their
decision-making process.
A look at the countrywide court budgets explains the
sponsoring role of local governments. In 2009, the total
funding received by the Chinese courts was 46.78 billion
yuan, of which 7.98 billion yuan, or about 17 percent, came
from the transfer payment funds of the central
government.60 Another 2.7 billion yuan, or 5.8 percent, were
supporting funds from provincial governments. 61 Together
they made up just about a quarter of the court funding. The
remaining 36.1 billion yuan, or about three-fourths of the
funding, were local money not controlled by the SPC and the
provincial high courts.62
Grassroots and intermediate courts serve the interests of
the local governments who build the courthouses and pay the
bills, rather than the interests of the central government who
laid down the law. This is what the new budgeting policy
introduced by the latest judicial reform (which took effect in
2016) tries to fix. Under the policy, the majority of the
funding comes from the central and provincial governments.
The goal of the policy is to take the financial stick out of the
hands of lower-level governments. Grassroots courts still
rely on local governments for major capital projects, such as
new court buildings and investment in new technologies. But
the main source of funding should shift from the local to the
central. This is a move that until most recently the SPC has
lobbied for years without much success. 63 The process
represents a clear departure from the “local money” model
60. Humei Tang, et al., Quanguo Fayuan Jingfei Baozhang Tizhi Gaige
Qingkuang Diaoyan Baogao (全 国 法院 经费 保障 体制 改革 情 况调 研报 告 ) (The
Survey Report on the National People’s Court’s Guaranteed Funding System),
RENMIN SIFA (PEOPLE’S JUDICATURE), no. 17, 2011, at 75.
61. Id. at 76.
62. Id.
63. Susan Trevaskes, Political Ideology, the Party, and Politicking: Justice
System Reform in China, 37 MOD. CHINA 315, 319–20 (2011).
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that has been in place since the 1990s.
We can now see more clearly what the central
government wants to do with the judicial reform. Ruling the
country according to law is not mere propaganda. It is a
message sent to judges working at different levels of the
courts. It means honoring the central government’s policy
intent. That much is clear. But it is equally important to
point out what “ruling the country according to law” does not
mean. From the perspective of the party state, it does not
mean applying the law rigidly as rules.
The second form of abuse of power is individual abuse of
power. Judicial corruption in China remains a problem. This
includes bribery and corruption, as well as the gray practice
of pulling guanxi in China. Judges were underpaid. That was
particularly the case in the biggest cities such as Beijing,
Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen in China. Attritions of
the most qualified judges in the big cities have suddenly
become a problem in recent years, much to the chagrin of the
party state. 64 Bribes are more tempting when the gap
between judicial salaries and that of the private sector grows.
What the latest judicial reform delivers (and this is one of the
most vocal demands from frontline judges) is to have judges’
salaries raised.65 Today a head judge in a big city court in
Guangdong can make RMB 30,000 (about $4,200) a month.
The salary is quite high for a grassroots government official.
Lawyers working in the private sector still make a lot more,
especially those working in the coastal region. But the
judicial salaries are now substantially higher than nonjudicial bureaucrats of comparable ranks. The party state is
understandably wary of creating disparities among some of
its own. But they went ahead to do so to make judges less
susceptible to bribery. This, coupled with more stringent

64. Cohen, supra note 58.
65. See Cao Yin, Top Court Vows to Raise Judges’ Pay, CHINA DAILY (July 9,
2014, 07:25 AM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-07/09/content_1767
8125.htm.
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anti-corruption measures, creates the “carrot and stick”
approach meant to reduce the abuse of power at the
individual level. By raising the salaries of judges, the central
government expects individual judges to give loyal effort to
the law, or rather, the policy intent of the law.
Under the reform, judges who preside over a case would
be responsible for the case for the rest of their judicial career.
The purpose of this “lifetime responsibility” policy is to hold
individual judges accountable for the cases they handle. It
aims to eliminate the intervention of more senior judges from
the same court. Intervention from above is a perennial
problem in the Chinese courts. It is uncertain whether the
policy works to stymie intervention. Many Chinese
academics and judges themselves are doubtful. 66 But the
intent of the party state is quite clear. It is again to remind
frontline judges that the law is policy statement to be
honored and carried out.The “lifetime responsibility” policy
further confirms that Chinese judges are being regarded by
the party state as primarily bureaucrats rather than judicial
officials. To rectify the mistake of a judge, one appeals his or
her decision. But to rectify the mistake of a bureaucrat, one
asks that person to bear lifelong responsibility.
IV. THE RULES-BASED CHARACTER (OR THE LACK THEREOF)
OF THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM
The latest judicial reform aims to produce more faithful
frontline judges; their faithfulness is manifest in
implementing the party state’s policies. Despite the pledged
commitment to law in important policy documents such as
the Communiqués of the Third and the Fourth Plenary
Sessions of the 18th Central Committee, many lower-level
bureaucrats remain skeptical that a solely rules-based

66. See Xu Zhenhua & Wang Xingguang, Faguan Banan Zeren Zhuize de
Dijinshi Moshi Tanjiu (法官办案责任追责的递进式模式探究) (Exploring Different
Models
of
Judicial
Responsibility)
(September
14,
2017),
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/5sBRftvfFPRvh-oH7HSVlA.
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system is flexible and agile enough for effective governance,
to carry out the eclectic brand of paternalistic/socialist justice
(“socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics”) that the
party state promotes. Similarly, the party state does not
seem to view determinacy as fundamental to its legal system.
In dealing with some difficult cases, judges use their
discretionary power to maneuver the gray zone between the
legal and the illegal. The state condones judges’ use of
discretionary power, as long as they are not using it for
personal gains or favors. The exercise of flexibility greases
the wheels of this legal-administrative machine.
Notwithstanding all the laws and regulations that the state
has passed since the 1980s, the Chinese judicial process has
built in and still allows for plentiful discretions.67 As Potter
points out, discretion remains a key element in criminal
prosecution and sentencing, and in fact, in other areas of
law.68 And because law is policy, the exercise of discretion by
individual judges is monitored by bureaucratic oversight and
sanction, not by legal rules or the judicial mechanism of
appeal.
The reliance on judges’ discretion is almost a matter of
necessity. The People’s Republic of China is not a federation.
It is a single unitary political entity. China has the largest
unitary judicial system in the world. There are over 3,000
courts scattered around the country. It is one of the most
centralized and certainly the biggest system in the world.69
Its laws are single unitary laws. There is no major distinction
between federal and state laws in China.70 There is one set
of laws that applies across the country. That set of laws is

67. See Benjamin L. Liebman, China’s Courts: Restricted Reform, 191 CHINA
Q. 620 (2007); Liebman, supra note 23.
68. POTTER, supra note 33, at 8.
69. If we include outpost tribunals or branch courts, the total would be more
than 13,000 courts.
70. Provincial people’s congresses and their standing committees may pass
local regulations. These regulations cannot contradict the constitution or
national laws and administrative regulations.
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the national laws promulgated by the National People’s
Congress and its standing committee. The laws are, on
paper, uniform. The purported uniformity of law, however,
means that it is ill equipped to deal with the broad spectrum
of problems appearing across different parts of the country.
For this unitary system to work in a big and varied country
with various degrees of economic development and social and
communal structures, it has to allow judges to apply the law
flexibly. I use the word “apply” rather than “interpret,”
because the flexibility of Chinese judges is of an
administrative nature. The use of mediation, as mentioned,
is one key practice to instill flexibility. But judges also have
other unofficial discretions to adapt the law to accord with
local situations. The discretions are unofficial or gray
because what judges do sometimes seem to go against the
spirit of the law. For example, they have discretion in
deciding when a case should be heard. They speed up a case
when they want to push for a decision, or slow it down when
they do not want to come to a decision. Judges also seem to
have more leeway in sentencing and offering suspended
sentences, compared to their American counterparts.
If we analyze the Chinese legal system by using jurist
H.L.A. Hart’s famous concepts of primary rule and secondary
rule,71 the Chinese system today has grown tremendously in
primary rules, as evidenced by the promulgation of new laws
in substantive areas. These laws are, however, policy
statements that need to be flexibly applied. Compared to the
flourish of the primary rules, the system is not at all
developed in secondary rules, or rules about rules, be they
constitutional, evidential, and procedural. Secondary rules
clarify the conditions under which primary rules can be
introduced, modified, or enforced. 72 As rules about rules,
they, if enforced, take discretion away from judges. And this
is the area that the CCP has been most cautious to make

71. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 78–79 (Clarendon Press 1972).
72. Id. at 79.
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changes. One may even say that the Chinese system resists
secondary rules. The CCP’s pushback against what it views
as a form of legal formalism is one ideological trait that it
inherits from the old Soviet system.73
For example, there is not a lot of statutory interpretation
in written judgments. Most Chinese judgments, even those
from the appellate courts, are quite terse and do not devote
much attention to spelling out the precise relationship
between relevant statutory provisions and their application
to the case.74 It is often unclear what interpretive principles
judges follow in applying the law. In some instances, judges
are legalistic and literal. In other instances, they give what
appear to be intuitive decisions. Officially, judges are not
expected to interpret. Their job is to apply the law. Chinese
courts are not given the power of “judicial interpretation.”75
The SPC does have the power under the Organic Law of
People’s Courts to clarify national laws for lower courts. The
court occasionally issues “interpretation” on matters related
to the application of the law. They come in the form of
subsidiary laws that fill in the gaps of existing laws. Most of
these documents do not address issues related to judicial
interpretation. They are mainly expansions of the law to fill
gaps rather than commentaries about how to interpret the
law.
Perhaps some would object to my thesis of law as policy
implementation. Some observers argue that the judicial
reform seems to have elevated the status of law. There is, for
73. Xingzhong Yu, Legal Pragmatism in the People’s Republic of China, 3 J.
CHINESE L. 29, 36 (1989).
74. Weixia Gu, “Courts in China: Judiciary in the Economic and Societal
Transitions”, in ASIAN COURTS IN CONTEXT 487, 508–10 (Jiunn-rong Yeh & WenChen Chang eds., 2015).
75. The power of “judicial interpretation” rests in the National People’s
Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC). In 1981, the NPCSC delegated the
power of “judicial interpretations” (司法解释 sifa jieshi) to the SPC. But judicial
interpretations are not precedents; instead, they are usually abstract
interpretations adopted by the SPC, much like policy statements, and they should
be registered at the NPCSC.
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example, the growth of Chinese-style case law. One
development that results from the judicial reform is the
publication of guiding cases and the policy of making all
judgments from different levels of courts available online. In
2010, the SPC set up its guiding case system, where the SPC
issues batches of “guiding cases” on a regular basis, which
lower courts are asked to follow. The total number of guiding
cases, however, remains minuscule. More important, it is
difficult to see what judges follow when they follow the
guiding cases. There is no obvious equivalent of ratio
decidendi in the Chinese law. The guiding cases are case
summaries—the SPC do not expect judges in lower courts to
study the full texts and to figure out the ratio of the cases. In
other words, judges are instructed to follow the decisions in
the guiding cases. Guiding cases, as some have pointed out,
“are not expressions of metanorms exalting reason.” 76 The
SPC said as much—guiding cases are to be quoted for
judgment, but not to be cited for legal reasoning.77
The SPC also instructs lower courts to make their
judgments accessible to the public. Millions of judgments are
now open to public view. While promoting transparency, the
policy is not designed to further develop the case law of
China. The goal is to create a judicial panopticon, so to speak,
to again tackle the principal-agent problem. Grassroots
courts now know that they have to make their judgments
available. Making judgments available to the public creates
transparency; transparency in turn leads to more scrutiny.
As mentioned, judgments in China, even those of the guiding
cases, are not case law. The SPC repeatedly stated that prior
cases should not be cited in any judicial decision. Its goal is

76. Mark Jia, Chinese Common Law? Guiding Cases and Judicial Reform,
129 HARV. L. REV. 2213, 2232 (2016).
77. Adjudication Committee of the SPC, “Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu
Anli Zhidao Gongzuo de Guiding” Shishi Xize (《最高人民法院关于案例指导工作
的规定》实施细则) (Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the “Provisions of
the Supreme People’s Court Concerning Work on Case Guidance”) (2015)
(available at Chinalawinfo, www.lawinfochina.com).
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to make lower courts subject to the scrutiny of higher courts.
Again, what the party state wants is for judges to give loyal
effort to its policies—to have the interests of the party state
in mind.
Introducing more primary rules makes the system
comprehensive. But the concentrated development of
primary rules and the sparse presence of secondary rules
suggest that this layering of new laws is more a step towards
achieving faithful policy implementation than any serious
attempt to develop a stronger tradition of judicial reasoning.
There are differences across areas of law. In areas such as
commercial litigation and intellectual property, judges are
under more pressure to pay close attention to the law, mainly
because the stakes are higher and the scrutiny by counsel of
all parties is more intense. But even in those areas, there
remains a lingering concern that legal consideration is mixed
up with other forms of consideration.
V. CONCLUSION
The negative concept of rule by law is at best a
convenient fudge to underline the authoritarian and
repressive aspect of the Chinese judicial system. It is
important not to lose sight of the many other sides of the
Chinese courts that apparently escape the rule-by-law
narrative. Ideals such as the rule of law have sometimes been
used loosely to evaluate the behavior of the Chinese judicial
system. But the party state is pursuing something different.
The purpose of producing a positive account of law as policy
implementation is to try to gain some positive insights about
what is happening in China. It is to broaden the conceptual
repertoire available for researchers, particularly when
studying places whose legal traditions and social conditions
are different from the more familiar Anglo-American
tradition.78

78. This is the point that Cheesman made. See Cheesman, supra note 8.
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The exercise, I believe, also helps to gain, albeit in a
backhanded way, a deeper understanding of the concept of
rule of law. Rather than defining the rule of law deductively
and then imposing the concept to China, we look into what is
practiced locally and see how this Chinese model of law as
policy implementation runs up against the rising
expectations for legal determinacy and clarity. In other
words, we can still gain an understanding of the rule of law,
not directly but obliquely, through identifying the limits of
the model of law as policy implementation. For example,
under the latter model, law is not a means to police the
actions of the central government. I don’t think we can expect
Chinese judges to give decisions that are maddening to the
leaders of the party state. It is a testimony of the convergence
of power that what happened in countries such as Egypt,
Pakistan, Zimbabwe, and Malaysia, where top judicial
officials were removed from their jobs for the judgments they
handed down, did not happen in China. As Chinese leaders
repeatedly said, the law serves the leadership of the party,
not the other way around. Judges in China are well aware of
that. What has been happening in the judicial reform is that
the Chinese judiciary is to some extent empowered (and
scrutinized), but the empowerment is for more effective
policy implementation and is quite different from a
strengthened rule of law. In practice, this means that power
is given to frontline judges in the form of administratively
guided discretions. Judges use the law to promote the
policies of the central government. This “policy” role of law
will only be further promoted as the party celebrates the
seventieth anniversary of the People’s Republic of China this
year.

